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Introduction
President Harry Truman was supposed to have said in desperation, "I
am tired of all the economists who always say, 'On the one hand and, then
again, on the other hand.' Send me a one-armed economist." Although
Paul Samuelson once responded that a one-armed economist is a cripple,
this report is an effort to supply serious answers, without much equivocation, to some of the key issues facing the American people. In the spirit of
Harry Truman, it will have a minimum of hemming and hawing. It is not
meant to be a textbook on how to be an economist, but rather a guide to a
number of today's important economic questions.
What are some of those key matters? As I travel around the country and
speak to a wide variety of groups, some of the questions I am regularly
asked are the following:
• Can the U.S. government ever control the federal budget? Are those $200
billion deficits inevitable? Why doesn't Congress cut all the waste and inefficiency out of the budget?
• Can we do anything about military spending? If everyone knows about
the waste in the Pentagon, why can't anyone stop it?
• Are America's smokestack industries really going down the tube?
• What are we going to do about foreign competition? How can we possibly compete against cooley wages and foreign government subsidies?
• Why is the government trying to cut my Social Security? After all, I paid
for it.
• Who are all those special interests we hear so much about?
• Why is American education going downhill, even though we are spending
more for it?
• Is "Reaganomics" working? And if it is, what does it mean for the future of the economy?
• Shouldn't our economy be more centrally planned? Don't we need a U.S.
MITI in order to beat the Japanese at their own game?
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business
and Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis.
He is a former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Editorial assistance was
provided by Ronald J. Penoyer.
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• Isn't a large part of the problem with American business the stupid decisions made by management?
• Has the regulatory apparatus really changed much under the Reagan Administration?
• What can individual citizens do to protect themselves-or to change
things?
• And the inevitable question: if you are so smart, why aren't you rich?
The following essays deal with diverse economic issues such as these-except for the last! -with which I have been concerned over the years. I have
tried to keep each essay short and to-the-point. The first section deals with
several important issues that affect private enterprise in America todayranging from the record-high federal budget deficits, to current discussions
of the need for a national ''industrial policy,'' to the demands made on
businesses by corporate activists.
The second section surveys problems in the world economy, particularly
the resurgent sentiment for protectionism. It also contains an analysis of a
new form of international regulation of business in which the United Nations is involved. The third section contains essays on various aspects of
government regulation, an economic issue that I have studied for a number
of years.
The final section of this report presents assessments of where we stand in
a decade of important economic change, as well as a prognosis of where we
are headed. The challenge we face in economic policymaking in the 1980s is
a matter of making hard decisions and avoiding easy answers. On this
score, I remain optimistic. I am impressed at how much nonsense we have
unlearned-some of it very recently-and how many old and more modest,
but harder, truths have been confirmed.
Those truths often are in need of reaffirmation, since our concern with
the free enterprise system in the United States is part of a larger national
debate over fundamental values. It behooves us, in short, to relate economic issues-which often seem transient or limited in scope-to the broader
interests of the public. We tend to lose sight of the fact that the close correspondence between economic freedom and personal liberty is not accidental. If we find it hard to be convinced of that fact, we need only spin
the globe and take a good, hard look.
Taken as a whole, these essays are intended to reflect a concern not only
with our economic system, but also with our more basic desire to maintain
and strengthen the free and voluntary society of which the economy is a
vital but only constituent part. In fact, the shortest essay I could write
would simply state that political freedom requires economic freedom. We
foster one as we pursue the other.
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I. Key Issues Facing Private Enterprise

Beware of Megabaloney
Anyone traveling around the country, especially the older industrial areas
of the Midwest, increasingly encounters a feeling often approaching despair. Clearly, there is genuine reason for concern about the future in regions of high unemployment and declining sales. But I did not expect to
find so many employed people and profitable companies joining in the talk
of doom and gloom. So many of them now worry that manufacturing industries are all going down the tube, that only high-tech companies and
knowledge workers will have a role in tomorrow's economy. What is the
basis for this expectation? It turns out that there is currently a bull market
for "big thinkers" who express their thoughts in dramatic absolutes.
In widely circulated books and magazines, the big thinkers blithely tell us
that the industrial era is over, that we are now living in an economy which
is based only on the creation and distribution of information. On reflection, taking such overstatement at face value is just silly. Are we going to
eat information, wear information, house ourselves in information?
Of course, the so-called knowledge industries or research-intensive companies are key growth sectors of the economy. But decades before we
learned the buzzword ''high-tech,'' these were already the dynamic parts of
our society. Just as surely, however, the production of goods will not
wither away. After all, we will still need machines to produce and distribute
knowledge and information.
Moreover, major non-manufacturing industries (often called the "service" sector) are important customers for the output of manufacturing corporations. Utilities and airlines are obvious examples of capital-intensive,
non-manufacturing operations. To the many executives in industrial firms
who fear for their future, I urge them to discount the bloated vocabulary of
the big thinkers who tell us that yesterday is over, that there are just two
sectors of the economy (sunrise and sunset companies), and that we are becoming a microeconomic information self-help society, characterized by a
galaxy of networking constellations. We must label such meaningless collections of buzzwords as Megabaloney!
Of course, stripped of the rhetoric, there are serious problems facing industrial corporations-but they are solvable. However, these problems will
not fade away by blaming ''unfair imports'' and by running to Washington
for help.
Many manufacturing companies have to deal with two related but incompatible trends-falling productivity and rising operating costs. When we
compare, for example, U.S. and Japanese production experience, the results are very revealing. A study of the U.S. and Japanese automobile industries reveal that their absenteeism rate is 3 Y2 percent and ours is almost
12 percent. Their labor turnover is 2 percent and ours is 15-20 percent. We
cannot blame our poor labor practices on foreigners. It is no tribute to
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either managerial leadership or worker conscientiousness when a large U.S.
manufacturing company has to give a bonus each time an employee puts in
a full work week! It is no surprise that this company is losing its share of
world markets.
The industrial heartland of our nation surely needs to be strengthened.
But that does not mean propping up industries via import restrictions or
government subsidies-or preventing them by law from closing down or
''running away.'' Rather, labor and management in each company need to
face the challenge of greater productivity and enchanced competitiveness.
Management must show the way. Cutting back on the proliferation of staff
activities and layers of executives creates an operating environment in which

Discount the bloated vocabulary of big thinkers who
tell us we are becoming a microeconomic information
self-help society, characterized by a galaxy of
networking constellations
changes in needlessly costly workrules can be made and wage rates and
fringe benefits brought back to reality.
No, the sun is not going to set on U.S. manufacturing companies. In
fact, it will rise on those that make the hard decisions that bring productivity up and costs down. And that's not megabaloney.

Fallacies of "Industrial Policy"
As predictable as Spring crocuses, the high level of unemployment has
led to pleas for an ''industrial policy'' to restore the health of the American
economy. By guiding investment into growth areas and out of declining
markets, a new federal industrial policy supposedly will restore the competitiveness of American business at home and abroad. What is especially disconcerting about this development is the number of business executives who
are joining in this chorus for more governmental intervention-these are
men and women who normally champion private enterprise and oppose a
bigger role for Uncle Sam in business decision making.
One of the focal points for the advocates of industrial policy is the proposed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), a
creature of the Depression of the 1930s that grew rapidly during and following World War II. Those with short memories may think well of that
government enterprise, but a review of its activities is instructive for today's
situation. Under the original act passed in 1932, Congress granted the RFC
very modest lending powers limited to railroads and financial institutions.
During the next six years, however, the agency's authority was steadily
broadened. By 1938, it had the power to buy the securities of any business
enterprise. Although it may have made a useful contribution during the Depression and World War II, the RFC made most of its loans to business in
the postwar boom period of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
By .1949, rumors circulated that connections with influential people in
Washmgton were often the real criterion for gaining loan approvals from
the RFC. Congressional hearings disclosed numerous examples of favoritism in the granting of RFC loans. Finally, in 1953, Congress ended the life
of this now discredited agency. The history of the RFC shows that government subsidy of business encourages and perpetuates a misallocation of resources. The agency's loans included such "high priority" ventures as distillers, brewers, drive-in theaters, hotels, motels, and bars. The RFC experience also demonstrates that government programs develop a life of their
own and persist long after the problems for which they were created have
been solved.
Variations on the negative theme of focusing on the "losers" are not limited to the notion of bringing back the RFC. Some would attempt to stop
economic change by dealing with the so-called "runaway plant problem."
Their response is to make it extremely difficult and costly to move or close
down an industrial facility. This "King Canute approach" ignores the reasons why companies are forced to take such actions in the first place. So
frequently, those plants have lost their competitiveness due in large part to
the government policies advocated by the same groups that now support
legislation preventing factory closings. Such proposals also overlook the
negative signals that this policy would send out to any company considering
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building a new plant in a region that has adopted restrictive legislation (and
a few states have already done so).
All this, however, need not lead to a "do nothing" approach to the serious economic questions that face the United States. There is a growth strategy that involves no expansion in either government power or federal
spending. Its elements are basic-tax simplification, regulatory relief, lower
deficit financing, and curtailed government lending. In each of these areas,
much needs to and can be done.
Although the 1981 tax reductions were surely welcome, the tax code is
far more complicated today than it was just a few years ago. Simplification
is especially important to the smaller firm. Similarly, the recent regulatory
relief effort has accomplished much in reducing the burden of new rules.
But fundamental improvement can come only from revising statutes that
mandate unreasonable compliance burdens, such as the "zero discharge"
goal of the Clean Water Act and the "zero risk" provision of the Delaney
Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
It is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial-policy proposals for
funneling federal funds to "worthy" private investment areas at a time

A growth strategy involves tax simplification,
regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and curtailed
government lending
when the federal government is running budget deficits of $200 billion a
year. The most effective way to increase private capital formation is to reduce the federal drain on private saving represented by massive deficit financing.
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing Peter
to pay-or lend to-Paul. They do nothing to increase the pool of private
saving, but reduce the amount available in the private market. The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is well known- reduce
government barriers to competition and achieve a better functioning market
economy.
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Corporate Activists: Politicizing Business
"Truth-in-labeling" is a concept with which every business executive has
become well-acquainted. Yet it is ironic that many of the organizations and
individuals that fought for the enactment of such statutes would flunk the
most elementary truth-in-labeling test themselves. Take the example of the
"corporate activists~'
Judging by their self-designated title, you would expect that corporate activists were engaged in the worthy enterprise of attempting to energize a
sluggish company or were concerned with improving the economic performance of American business. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
typical ''corporate activists'' are oblivious to the economic role of private
enterprise. Producing and distributing the goods and services that meet consumers' needs is too humdrum a task to attract their interest.
Rather, they see the resources of the private enterprise system as a means
for achieving their social ends. One term they love to use is corporate or
economic democracy. But, on the contrary, they refuse to abide by the decisions of this nation's democratic political processes. They will buy a few
shares of stock in a company-not as an investment-but to use the annual
meeting as an opportunity to try to force the company to follow their pet
social or political goals. These are goals which they are unable to convince
Congress to adopt-such as an embargo of trade with specific nations or
imposing our internal social standards on other countries.
Thus, it is not surprising that, in recent years, shareholders in company
after company have overwhelmingly voted down proposals such as one
which would have required a company to invite a writer on solar energy to
speak (at the annual meeting) on alternative energy sources. Imagine the
waste of time and money involved in processing such a frivolous requestor the presumptuous proposal to prohibit a cigarette producer from selling
its products in a country where the government does not warn against
smoking. Those "activist" shareholder resolutions cover a wide variety of
issues: limiting or prohibiting business in South Africa, controls over consumer marketing in the developing nations, and restraints on plant closings
or relocation.
Some of the activists' shareholder proposals involve great detail. One
wo~ld req~ire a company to report on the environmental impact of a project m Brazil. Another would have a bank stop lending to Guatemala. Still
another would require a company to report on a plant closing in South
Korea, providing an analysis of its employment practices.
Not all the activists are on the left. Prohibiting trade with Communist
nations is a perennial proposal by activists on the right. These proposals
~ould require either ending trade links with Communist nations or adoptmg company policies to avoid buying or selling goods involving organizations engaged in "slave labor."

7

All these proposals share a common, fundamental defect: they ~ould
politicize basic business actions. Buying and selling goods ~nd services
would become political acts, to be debated at annual meetmgs by groups
that have no interest in the firm's welfare. Each company would be forced

"Corporate activists" see the resources of the private
enterprise system as a means of achieving their social ends
to adopt and pursue its own notions of what should be our foreign policy,
environmental policy, and so forth.
. .
Fortunately, the great majority of indiv~dual shareholders and mstitutional investors have more wisdom. They consider some of these matters as
proper for government, but not for business decision makin~ .. The proper
response to the various "activists" should ~ot ?e.the patromzmg one of
saying, ''they are well-intentioned, but . . . . Wittmgly or no~, these efforts
to politicize the business system would weaken the eco~omy s. perf~r~ance
and reduce support for the private enterprise system. VIewed m this ~Ight,
stockholder resolutions introduced by most activist groups are anythmg but
well-intentioned and should be vigorously opposed!
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How to Keep Income Tax Indexation
Continuing deficits in the federal budget in the range of $200 billion annually reflect our inability as a nation to make tough decisions and to
choose among alternatives-each of which has strong attractions. The adamant defense of retaining the scheduled indexing of the federal personal income tax in 1985 is an important case in point. As a means of reducing
"bracket creep" and eliminating the government's gain from inflation, indexing of the tax structure is, of course, an inherently desirable type of tax
reform. In fact, many of us used that argument in urging the Congress in
1981 to enact the Economic Recovery Tax Act which, in its amended form,
included this provision.
Yet it is clear that tax reduction-and, despite all the obfuscation, tax
collections will be lower with indexing-is part of the deficit problem. We
have learned the hard way that, despite a great deal of wishful thinking to
the contrary, cutting revenues does not automatically lead to reduced government spending. In fact, since the enactment of the 1981 tax law, the expenditures of the federal government have continued rising faster than the
economy. In real terms, the spending path is almost indistinguishable from
the one traced out in President Carter's swansong budget message.
We must reluctantly acknowledge the sad fact that across-the-board income tax rate reductions do indeed increase deficits. Those of us who are
committed to a smaller public sector must focus our efforts on the more
obvious but difficult approach -directly reducing the flow of government
spending. And, thus, we see that there is no substitute for getting Congress
to appropriate less in the first place.
It is discouraging to note how many of the proponents for retaining tax
indexing pay only lip service to the need to slow down the rapid upward
trend of government spending. They assure us that they are staunch advocates of smaller budgets. But so many of them fall by the wayside when
specific budget cuts are proposed, protesting that entitlements are too difficult to cut, defense spending is politically too important to cut, and the
other categories are too small to mess with.
In a very real sense, we have not earned the indexing of the federal income tax structure. If we are to avoid losing that desirable reform of the
tax system, we must begin another round of comprehensive budget cuts.
We must not be distracted-as was the case last year-with proposals to
increase Social Security taxes, excises, tariffs, etc.
That highly necessary round of budget cuts should aim at achieving the
traditional goal of federal budget practice: good budgeting is the uniform
distribution of dissatisfaction. Alas, not enough federal departments and
agencies-and their private-sector allies-have become dissatisfied by the
budget cuts that have been made so far. The rationale for shifting from the
5 percent annual real growth in military spending, which was a key point of
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the 1980 Presidential campaign, to 10 percent remains unexplained. Surely,
our military posture has not deteriorated in these last two years.
Likewise, accelerating Social Security tax collections is no substitute for
meeting head on the basic shortcoming of the federal government's "social
insurance" programs: the benefit payments are far in excess of what an insurance program would be expected to provide-that is, benefits based on
the payments by employees and their employers, including the earnings on
those contributions. Although the term is upsetting to many, the hard fact
is that the major portion of the average recipient's monthly Social Security
check is the economic equivalent of welfare, a compulsory transfer of purchasing power from somebody else to the recipient.
Nor should the remainder of the federal budget escape tough scrutiny. A
host of subsidies to special interests-sugar producers, dairy producers,
ship builders, ship operators, exporters, and energy producers, to mention a
few-remains in the federal budget. Each one of these items is an attractive
candidate for elimination.
However desirable as a tax reform, we should be careful not to claim too
much for indexing of the tax structure. For example, some proponents
claim that eliminating the indexing provision would produce a powerful incentive for Congress to force the Federal Reserve System to follow an inflationary monetary policy. There is no need to guess what the response would
be. In 1981-82, in the absence of an indexed tax system, the Fed did indeed
pursue a deflationary monetary policy. The notion that the primary motivation of the Congress in the monetary policy area is to inflate the currency in
order to reduce the deficit is just plain silly. It flies in the face of experience; if anything encourages excessive stimulation, it is the response to high
unemployment.
Similarly, the idea that repeal or postponement of indexing would immediately lead to a rise in long-term interest rates and a weakening of therecovery sounds quite divorced from reality. Passage of the indexing provi-

surely we must lower spending first. The lessons of recent economic policy
and practice are clear: lower taxes do not achieve lower government spending levels; rather, lower spending permits the responsible reduction of government tax schedules.

We need to cut spending first in order to justify the move
to indexing at a time of massive deficit financing
sion surely did not lead to a decline in long-term rates or to a strengthening
of the economy's growth rate-nor did it cure baldness! If anything, financial markets will respond very positively to the prospect of lower deficits.
Boiled down to its essentials, the case for postponing the indexing of the
federal income tax system is one of avoiding instant gratification. We need
to cut spending first in order to justify the move to indexing at a time of
massive deficit financing. Such reductions in government outlays would
make the retention of indexing more likely. Moreover, under such new circumstances, indexing would become an attractive way of developing pressure to maintain a lower federal spending level well into the future. Yet,
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Dollars vs. Incentives in Education
It has become fashionable to bemoan the inadequacy of federal spending
on education. Some attention to this important area is surely warranted.
When we probe beneath the surface, however, it becomes clear that the
problem of educational quality in the United States is not primarily a question of the amount of money devoted to this purpose but how we spend it.
In 1974, the Federal Government disbursed $4.6 billion for aid to elementary, secondary, vocational, and higher education. In 1983, the budget estimate for educational assistance is over $13.3 billion, almost three times as
much as the amount spent at the beginning of the decade. During the same
period, we have seen substantial deterioration in the measured performance
of students. Clearly, simply spending more money on education is not sufficient. This is not a justification, however, to spend less on our schools.
Rather, experience underscores the need to improve the effectiveness with
which the funds are used.
My suggestion is to stress the role of incentives-incentives for both students and teachers. For students, we need to provide incentives to perform.
Blithely promoting students on the basis of their age and giving them (I use
that verb advisedly) a high school diploma when they hit IS-regardless of
their academic performance-provides no incentive to work hard.
When I was in Florida recently, I observed the fierce discussions aroused
by the State's new policy of issuing a high school diploma only when it is
earned. I was particularly impressed by the statement of one high school
principal that the students in his school moved from way below average
performance on the statewide tests to substantially above average only after
the school began to stress the need for performance. For many if not most
of us, studying is hard work. Why do it if you get promoted and graduate
whether you apply yourself or not?
By the way, I read some of the questions in Florida's new statewide testing program. That was quite an eye-opener. One question was roughly as
follows. It showed two clocks, one at 1:50 and the other at 2:10. The student was told that when Joe came in the room, the clock was in the first
position, and when he left it was at the second position. The question was,
"How long was Joe in the room?" To those who criticize such basic attempts at performance testing, I must reply: How can we expect a young
new worker to get to the job on time if he or she cannot even tell time?
How can a person even get the job if he or she cannot fill out the application form? The links between education and incentives and productivity are
very strong.
Likewise, incentives can play an important role at the teachers' level, too.
That approach could help alleviate the shortage of math and science teachers. In an economy with a rising need for people with mathematical and scientific skills, how do we encourage more people to go into those fields?
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The answer is not very complicated. We pay them more.
But try doing that at the high school level. The reaction is predictable:
howls of outrage. "Aren't gym teachers and social studies teachers as
worthy as math and science teachers? Why should they be paid any less?'' I
do not mean to be offensive, but frankly, that attitude betrays economic illiteracy. Income is not a matter of inherent nobility. Indeed, it is a matter
of attracting people to the areas of work in which they are needed.

The links between education and incentives and
productivity are very strong
If colleges and universities paid science teachers and classics teachers the
same, we would have a chronic shortage of physicists and a surplus of
Latin professors. The prospect of higher pay is an important factor in encouraging more students to major in physics and math. Standard, acrossthe-board pay increases for teachers may seem to make the administrator's
job easier, but that only worsens the shortage situation. Far more important, the old-fashioned approach to teachers' pay short-changes the student.
The introduction of incentives will not be easy. The idea goes counter to
the oldest bureaucratic argument for the status quo: "that's the way we
have always done it." But given the realistic alternatives, greater use of incentives is an effective way of strengthening the educational process and
improving the performance of our young people-not only in school but
throughout their careers.
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The Federal Budget Quandary
Polar alternatives and dramatic extremes are always likely to attract public attention. Discussions of the finances of the federal government are no
exception. On the one hand, there are many economists and others who
contend that budget deficits do not matter at all. They cite as evidence the
current robust recovery in the face of an estimated $200 billion of federal
borrowing.
On the other hand, there is no shortage of financial and economic authorities who point to the same deficit as the fundamental source of high interest rates, the large foreign trade deficit, declining business investment,
and other economic problems.
Neither extreme is an accurate description of reality. The more likely outcome-as is so frequently the case in economic disputations-is in that unattractive and dull middle position. When the government runs a deficit,
that does make a difference. But surely deficits are not the only thing that
matters. The underlying strength of the private sector is far more basic. In
the short run, money supply changes swamp fiscal effects. Moreover, the
impacts of government spending and deficit financing vary over time.
In fact, time is the key. In the short run, a strong recovery in the economy is underway. According to my foggy crystal ball, this recovery will last
at least until the polls close that Tuesday in November in George Orwell's
year.
But there are clouds on the e'conomic horizon. As citizens, we should be
concerned about dealing with them right now. As business executives, we
should crank that into our long-term planning. There are two major and
overlapping clouds-the possibility that monetary policy will stay too easy
too long, and the danger that fiscal or budget policy will continue to generate large deficits even as the economy continues to recover.
In the monetary policy area, I hope that my standard analysis of the Federal Reserve Board's actions in the past is not appropriate once more: too
much, too late. Combined with the budget deficits, we seem to be witnessing a version of conventional Keynesian stop-and-go policies, but without
those pejorative labels. Personally, I believe that fiscal policy shortcomings
constitute the basic culprit, and I will dwell upon them in a moment.
Monetary policy, at least for 1981 and 1982, bore the responsibility for
bringing down the inflation-and bringing down employment, too. Since
then, monetary growth has been the major engine of recovery, but I hope
that the Fed does not overdo the stimulus.

The Initial Reagan Economic Program
In order to understand our current budget problems, we must go back to
the beginning-that is, to the beginning of 1981. On February 18, 1981,
President Reagan, in a major economic address, presented to the nation his
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program for economic recovery. A supporting White House documentthe so-called Economic White Paper-provided the detailed underpinnings
of "Reaganomics."
Specifically, the White Paper enunciated the four pillars of the program,
as we came to refer to them: tax cuts, spending cuts, regulatory relief, and
monetary restraint. Also included were the economic projections on which
the budget numbers were based. This was the "Rosy Scenario," a term that
I inadvertently coined. At an informal breakfast meeting with two Washington reporters at that time, I responded to their question about who
would be the other two members of the CEA with a wisecrack: I deny that
it will be an affirmative action hire known as Rosy Scenario.
The published forecast was a compromise between my view of reality and
that of the enthusiastic supply-siders who foresaw an instantaneous response to the tax cuts in the form of an unparalleled burst of saving, investment, and work effort. The official forecast did show a slight upturn in unemployment during an initial period of adjustment-but this was usually
overlooked by private analysts. In any event, beginning in 1982, the White
Paper projected an unusual pattern of rapid economic growth and declining
inflation.
Rosy-as we at times referred to the forecasts-did result in overestimating the government's revenues and underestimating expenditures. The upshot was that the White Paper showed much faster progress toward a balanced budget than it was reasonable to expect-even on the basis of the administration's policy proposals.
But, in retrospect, more fundamental shortcomings are evident, and they
dwell at the heart of the present budget quandary. That is, taxes were cut

Fundamental shortcomings are at the heart of the present
budget quandary. Taxes were cut more than envisioned
and expenditures far, far less
more than envisioned in the program for economic recovery and expenditures far, far less. The initial budget statement of the new Administration
had a line fpr "unspecified savings," presumably to be specified at a future
date. That reminds me of the old song, "Tomorrow, I'll be leaving, but tomorrow never comes." In a moment I will elaborate on this point. The resultant large and rising budget deficits, however, put the entire onus for
battling inflation on the Federal Reserve System.
In light of the widespread expectations of rising budget deficits, perhaps
it was not too surprising that the slowdown in the growth of the money
supply in 1981 was greater than the Fed's own target-a target which the
Administration repeatedly endorsed. I suggest, however, that the added
monetary restraint contributed to a larger and deeper recession than was
generally anticipated, and that, in turn, worsened the budget deficit.
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Progress on the Reagan Budget

The Budget Outlook

Let us return to the budget quandary. The Administration's original tax
proposal was to reduce the personal income tax by 10 percent a year for
three consecutive years and to liberalize depreciation allowances. In an effort to decrease the deficit, the first installment of the proposed personal
tax cut was reduced to 5 percent and postponed three months. But in the
subsequent negotiations with the Congress on the tax bill, a ''bidding'' war
occurred.
The result was to see the addition of many expensive and extended provisions added to the tax bill. These ranged from the temporary all-savers certificates to the permanent introduction of indexing. Other add-ons including increasing the attractiveness of Individual Retirement Accounts andreducing the marriage tax penalty. The financial markets interpreted all this
as meaning an extended period of deficit financing. The resultant rise in interest rates directly increased the budget deficit. To the extent that it exacerbated a weakness in capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the rise in
rates also indirectly contributed to higher deficits in the budget.
But what about all the spending cuts? One of the saddest but most revealing analyses is a comparison of President Carter's budget plans with
President Reagan's. On the surface, the growth in federal spending has
been slowed down. But, on inspection, the slowdown was virtually entirely
the result of lower inflation. Recasting the analysis in real terms is quite an
eye-opener. When we compare the projections of spending for 1982-86 in
President Carter's swansong budget with President Reagan's current numbers, we find that the differences are very small in real terms. In fact, it depends on which price index or deflator you use as to whether you find the
Carter or the Reagan real spending numbers to be lower. This finding may
come as a surprise to those who read so much about all those budget cuts.
But we must also take account of the continued rise in the "entitlements,"
in farm subsidies, and in military procurement.
I do not criticize only the Congress or the Administration. There is plenty
of blame to go around. After all, it was the President who submitted the
$200 billion deficit budget-and it is the Congress that is going along with
it. We truly are a democracy, with a small "d" of course. The people we
elect do represent us. When you get down to basics, it is the average citizen
who generates the pressure for more government spending. And please do
not kid yourselves. You do not get off the hook by saying, "I'm all for
economy in government, but ... don't cut the special project in my area or
the one benefiting my industry, because that is different. That is an important contributor to economic growth, etc.'' I still vividly recall my meeting
with the representatives of an interest group pleading for a handout from
the government. When I said, "That's the equivalent of welfare," they protested vehemently. Their unforgettable response was, "Welfare is for poor
people:'

I am not saying that budget deficits are good for us. The American economy would be a lot healthier if the deficits were half their present size. But
it seems clear that expansive monetary policy can, for a while, overcome
much of the depressing effect of sustained deficit financing. But only for a
while, and not completely.
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We are going to pay the price for those large deficitsin terms of higher interest rates, larger balance of trade
deficits, and lower economic growth
We are going to pay the price for those deficits-in terms of higher interest rates, larger balance of trade deficits, and lower economic growth than
we otherwise would have. But that is different from forecasting economic
doom and gloom. With an expanding economy and rising pool of saving,
those deficits will, over time, shrink in importance in both absolute and relative terms. But to the extent that they force the Fed to maintain excessive
stimulus, the deficits contribute to another round of inflation. Meanwhile,
housing and business investment will increase more slowly than would otherwise be the case. Thus, economic growth and the rise in living standards
will be modest-unless we take the unlikely course of engaging in another
round of comprehensive budget cuts.
I have become truly nonpartisan on this matter. When the Republicans
want to cut the social programs, I am with them. My service on the Budget
Working Group convinced me that there are many further opportunities for
economy in government-in every department and agency.
Yet when the Democrats want to shave the rapid defense buildup, I am
also with them. My studies of the defense industries convince me that production bottlenecks may be likely in the years ahead, when rising business
investment and expanding weapons production compete for the same limited resources. Unfortunately, the history of defense production tells us that
crash programs usually crash -or they get cancelled. By the way, that is
not poetry. In 1980 (the only year for which such data are available) most
of the weapons programs with big cost overruns were cut back. Hardly any
that stayed close to their targets suffered reductions in orders.
There is also no reason to maintain, for the indefinite future, a policy
that encourages members of the armed forces to retire in their early 40s and
receive generous pensions while actually working in civilian employment-and then also qualifying for one or more additional pensions. So
much for the notion that it is unpatriotic even to contemplate cutting the
military budget.
I part company with both sets of budget cutters, Republican and Democrat-because they both want to apply the savings from their budget cuts
to offset the cuts made by the other party. We need genuine reductions, not
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just a reorientation of federal spending. Remember my favorite a?vic~ to
Congressional committees, "Don't just stand there, undo somethmg.
I have no panacea to offer-other than the strong belief that there are no
panaceas. Beware of the easy answers. Salesmen notoriously have weak
sales resistance, and it is sad to note that dynamic business leaders tend to
demonstrate their sense of social responsiblity by uncritically accepting the
popular buzzword of the day. If supply-side economics did not solve our
ills neither will the adoption of an "industrial policy" nor a return to the
goid standard. The budget quandary represents our unwillingness as anation to make hard choices-and the natural reluctance of our elected leaders to keep our feet to the fire-and vice versa. If there is anything that I
learned during my recent tour of duty in Washington, it is that Pogo was
right. "We has met the enemy, and they is us."

The Defense Buildup: Is It Feasible?
The second largest category of outlays in the U.S Budget, after the socalled "entitlement" outlays, is national defense. Here we should acknowledge at the outset that there is a broad-based agreement on the need to expand U.S. national defense spending. Both the Carter and Reagan budgets
projected significant growth in defense spending, in real terms, for each of
the five fiscal years 1982-1986. As the Council of Economic Advisers stated
in its annual report accompanying the President's Economic Report of February 10, 1982, "any economic effects ... must be assessed in the context of
the overriding need for maintaining the level of defense spending necessary
for national security.''
Official projections of future defense outlays, after adjustment for inflation, have risen successively during the last two years from 5 percent to 10
percent per annum. I find little justification offered of the economic feasibility or of the military necessity of this sharply upward movement. A
tough-minded attitude should be taken to the military budget, comparable
to the treatment of many civilian spending activities of the federal government. Because of the potential capacity problems, a given cutback in nominal military spending would actually result in less than a proportional reduction in real procurement outlays. This would come about because of reduced price pressures on military purchasing generally.
As would be expected, there has been considerable disagreement over the
specifics of the buildup, including how rapid an expansion in military
spending is desirable. But none of this is a debate between hawks and
doves. Among the specific questions raised is the economic feasibility of the
currently contemplated schedule of military outlays. Moreover, the 1981-82
recession has resulted in such s·ubstantial amounts of excess capacity in
American industry that, at least for the next year or two, there is likely to
be adequate capacity to meet military and civilian needs. But it is useful to
look beyond, to the middle of the decade, when significant economic
growth may coincide with the peak of the military buildup. In such circumstances, capacity questions would arise and three results of the defense
buildup can be anticipated:
1. The substantial transfer of resources in the durable goods sector to defense production may increase prices in key industries. Both the Department of Defense and private purchasers would have to pay more
for goods purchased from these industries. This premium is likely to
increase with the size of the defense budget.
2. Increased demand may produce delays in the delivery of military
goods. Delivery timetables that seem realistic today may become obsolete as producers try to accommodate both the defense buildup and
the expansion in civilian investment.
3. Some crowding out of private investment may occur. Defense procure-
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ment uses many of the same physical resources needed for private investment and the law gives defense priority in the marketplace. Some
private flrms may turn to foreign sources, while others may cancel or
postpone plans for expansion.
When we examine the details of the military budget, we find that the
concentration of the planned military increases within the categories of procurement and research and development implies weapon production g.rowth
rates even more rapid than those which occurred at the peak of the VIetnam buildup. Moreover, the present expansion occurs after a decade of
steady reductions in the defense industrial base.
A private economic consulting organization, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI),
points out that ''the combination of the increasing. defens.e shares ~~~ the
acceleration in growth rates raises concerns about mdustnal capabilities and

A tough-minded attitude should be taken to
the military budget, comparable to that of many
civilian spending activities
spillover impacts on the economy.'' DRI goes on to note that, with the implementation of significant investment programs in both plant and equipment and skilled labor forces, the problems of price pressures, bottlenecks,
and crowding out of civilian demand ''could be constrained to isolated instances." Over the six-year period 1982-87, double-digit increases in annual
output are shown for many industries, ranging from semiconductors to ..
computers. I share the DRI conclusion that uncertainties about the capabthi.ies of the defense industrial base, and its linkages to other critical economic variables will continue to cloud decisions regarding the defense budget.
Since 1948, there has never before been a period of sustained growth in
real defense spending such as that now planned. The projected requirements for such large increases in defense output raise obvious questions
about the ability of industry to meet them without adverse implications in
terms of costs and lead times. A recent study by the U.S. Department of
Commerce reminds us that defense expenditures do not affect all industries
equally, but have "highly concentrated industrial impacts."
For most of the 58 major defense supplying industries Commerce
studied, the Department reported that existing capacity and planned increases are sufficient to supply the projected military and civilian demands
through 1985. However, the Department said that, should further capacity
expansion not take place in some of these industries, meeting projected
1985 requirements would mean using outmoded, economically inefficient
capacity, which would increase costs and prices. In any event, there are ~
few potential bottleneck areas. For example, requirements for lead smeltmg
and refining are projected to rise by 12 percent from 1979 to 1985, but economically efficient capacity is estimated to decline by 4 percent. Likewise,
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requirements for brass, bronze, and copper foundries are shown to increase
by 32 percent, but economically efficient capacity is expected to rise by 25
percent. How will all this balance out?
Some of our basic metal processing industries will likely increase their dependence on foreign sources of supply in order to meet the stepped-up military demands. For example, the electrometallurgical products industry
(which was specifically noted by the Commerce Department because of its
"qualitative importance to defense") met 27 percent of its needs with imports in 1979. That key industry is expected to increase its dependency to 45
percent in 1985. Likewise, zinc smelting and refining is anticipated to increase its import dependency from 33 percent in 1979 to 45 percent in 1985.
Imports of miscellaneous, refined nonferrous metals are estimated to comprise 66 percent of the industry in 1985, compared to 56 percent in 1979. It
is ironic to note the matter-of-fact way in which the Commerce Department
reports such increased foreign dependence for some of the key defense-producing industries. On many other occasions, the hoary national security argument is trotted out to justify a host of subsidies to sectors of the economy far less closely related to defense output.
An important implicit assumption arises from these concerns: any adjustment of scheduled defense outlays to conform more closely with expected
domestic production capabilities would result in slowing down the rate of
increase in defense spending in the next few years and, thus, lower the projected budget deficits.
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II. The Global Economy

A Positive Approach to Trade
As a nation, we love to pay lip service to the advantages of free trade.
Nevertheless, the United States seems to be moving back toward protectionism. Public policy debates are now dominated by one-sided, self-serving
views of international trade. Everyone wants open markets and free trade
overseas; we all know how urgent it is to eliminate "their" barriers to our
exports. But United States barriers to their exports do not generate much
interest over here.
Let me explain this with a very basic example-Country A and Country
B. Country A is on one side of the ocean, and Country B is on the other.
Country B has a large export surplus with Country A, and Country A experiences great difficulty getting its exports into Country B. Sounds familiar?
Of course, Country B is Japan (big trade surplus) and Country A is the
United States (big trade deficit).
But that is not the end of the story. When we take another look, we find
that Country B (big trade surplus) is the U.S. and Country A (big trade
deficit), Western Europe. Over the last decade, we have had a large trade
surplus with the European community, almost as large as our deficits with
Japan. And we have erected an array of obstacles to imports into the United States. Although many Americans are agitated over our trade deficits
with Japan, how many are even aware of our large trade surpluses with
Western Europe? It is not surprising that, given this difference in awareness, protectionist pressures are on the rise.
U.S. Barriers to Imports
It would help to clear the air in international trade discussions if the Uni-

ted States were to acknowledge that all of our actions are not on the side of
the angels. We have created many obstacles to inhibit imports into the United States.
"Buy American" statutes give preference to domestic producers in government procurement. As much as a 50 percent premium is paid for domestic production of military goods. In addition, American materials and products must be used for purchases over $500,000 under the program of aid to
mass transit. Also, American flag vessels must be used to ship at least 50
percent of the gross tonnage of all commodities financed with U.S. foreign
aid funds.
The Buy American laws of the states are varied. New York requires state
agencies to buy American steel. New Jersey requires that all state cars must
be domestically produced. In addition, numerous states and municipal
authorities require utilities, whether they are privately owned or publicly
owned, to use American materials.
The Jones Act prohibits foreign ships from engaging in commerce between American ports. This law, of course, effectively bars all competition
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in U.S. domestic marine transport. The perverse effects of such laws are
greater than might be expected. For example, at times Canadian lumber
transported by Japanese flag vessels has undersold domestic timber from
Oregon in the lucrative Southern California markets. In such cases, both
the American merchant marine and the American timber industry suffer
damage. Foreigners then become the unintended beneficiaries of these
backfiring attempts to subsidize the American merchant marine.
Many of our statutes limit imports of agricultural products such as sugar,
beef, dairy produce, and even mandarin oranges. Under the Meat Import
Act, the President has authority to impose beef import quotas if imports of
beef reach a certain trigger level. In practice, the U.S. generally has encouraged foreign exporters to restrain their sales voluntarily to avoid the imposition of formal quotas.
Our average tariff rates are low-scholarship requires me to state that
they are as low as Japan's! Yet, the United States does levy high tariffs on
selective items. Tariffs on textiles average 20 percent. Duties on fruit juices
are over 27 percent, and the rate on ceramic products is over 14 percent. In

It is not a question of merely accepting the existing array
of protection. The challenge is to deal with rising pressures
for further restriction of world trade
addition, numerous nontariff barriers, often of a regulatory nature, are imposed by federal, state, county, and municipal governments.
Despite this nation's overall free trade posture, "protection" against imports into the United States now covers such basic industries as automobiles, steel and textiles. Pleas for further trade restrictions extend to such
esoteric sectors as mushrooms, ceramic tableware, and even mechanics'
shop towels. It is not a question of merely accepting the existing array of
protection. The challenge is to deal with the rising pressures for further restriction of world trade.
The Pressures for Protectionism

The first step is to understand why protectionism is popular. It is a
means by which small, well-organized groups use the political process to
their advantage. The benefits are received by the protected industries, while
some costs are shifted to other companies that buy from the protected industries. Ultimately, most of the costs are borne by consumers in the form
of higher prices. Thus, protectionism can be viewed as a hidden tax on the
consumer. Like so many sales taxes, it is unfair. For example, a report
from the Center for the Study of American Business showed that "voluntary'' quotas on imports of footwear served as a regressive tax whereby
low-income consumers were harder hit than high-income consumers. The
Reagan Administration has eliminated these footwear quotas.
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Protectionist measures are a two-edged sword. They may reduce imports
from abroad-and the United States was "successful" in getting the Common Market to restrict its exports of steel to us. But our domestic automobile industry, a major purchaser of steel, bears the burden of higher costs,
which in turn will make it less competitive. All this generates pressures for
more protection-witness the domestic content bill recently proposed to
protect auto industry employment. In addition, lower imports mean fewer
dollars abroad to buy American exports.
Positive Approaches to Trade Policy

Let me outline five positive approaches to these problems. First and most
fundamental is carrying out domestic economic policies that expand production and incomes while holding down inflation. This, of course, is a
plug for tax simplification, spending reduction, and regulatory relief. A
healthy economy nips the protectionist sentiment in the bud.
Second is maintaining greater balance in macroeconomic policies. Our
shift in 1981 to tight monetary policy and expansive fiscal policy contributed substantially to high interest rates and a rise in the value of the dollar.
Smaller budget deficits will also help us to achieve smaller trade deficits.
Meanwhile, if we are not careful, we will see an easy money policy-coupled
with outsized budget deficits-lead to another inflationary spiral, which
would further reduce the competitiveness of U.S. products in world markets.
Third is limiting any government "trade adjustment assistance" -which
seems to be a politically necessary part of any comprehensive trade policyto temporary aid in shifting labor and capital from industries hard hit by
imports to more competitive activities. All too often, the government aid
merely maintains an inefficient and uncompetitive industrial structure.
That, in turn, adversely affects our competitiveness in world markets and
generates further pressure for additional protectionist measures. The result
is lower domestic employment, which, in turn, generates additional pressures for government interference. That is an example of a more general
principle: government intervention begets more government intervention.
In a healthy and dynamic economy we must expect that some industries
and regions will grow more rapidly than others and that some sectors will
experience difficulty in maintaining their position and may even decline.
We must rely primarily on market forces, and not on government bailouts,
to make the appropriate adjustments. We only fool ourselves if we think
that the solution to the real problems facing American industry is more
government intervention -and that federal aid does not come with strings
attached. Any business executive who still believes that government is his
friend is too naive to be let out alone at night.
Fourth is acknowledging the positive role of multinational corporations
in the world economy. Multinationals adapt to change more readily and are
less likely to plead for protection than other companies. They also are the
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private-sector alternative to foreign aid and other types of ~overnment i?tervention. This, of course, explains why so-called transnatiOnal enterpnses

We only fool ourselves if we think that the solution to
the real problems facing American industry is more
government intervention
are not universally popular and are being attacked in international organizations.
Fifth is focusing on improving our own productivity. We cannot blame
our poor production practices on foreigners. The answer is not to prop up
industries via import restrictions or government subsidies-or to prevent
them by law from closing down or ''running away.'' Rather, labor and
management in each company need to face the challenge of greater produc-.
tivity and enhanced competitiveness.
The current economic problems that face the U.S. and many other countries will not be solved by responding to the parochial concerns of individual industries and regions. Nor should international economic relations be .
dominated by short-term protectionist pressures from the producers o~ edible seaweeds, casein, and manhole covers-to name some recent candidates
for protection. We will truly strengthen our foreign trade posture only as
we improve our domestic productivity and competitiveness.
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The Benefits of Free Trade
Some broader perspective on the current debate about free trade versus
protectionism is useful. The case for free trade is rooted in a basic economic law: the principle of comparative advantage, which holds that total economic welfare will be enhanced if each nation specializes in the production
of items that it can produce, in relative terms, most efficiently. This, of
course, is an important case of Adam Smith's more general point concerning the advantages of the specialization of labor.
Historical Experience
The arguments in favor of free trade are supported by a great deal of historical evidence. Through most of the twentieth century, the United States
has played a strong leadership role in developing the world trading system.
During the 1930s, however, the United States and many other countries followed "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies which contributed substantially
to the worldwide depression. Unfortunately, as a people we have short institutional memories. Why, many of our students seem to think that
Smoot-Hawley is a British rock group! But let us recall that it was the
Smoot-Hawley protectionist tariff that epitomized the beggar-thy-neighbor
approach in the United States. The results for many companies were extremely negative. Firms that had relied on substantial foreign business were
limited to the domestic market, which for some was inadequate for survival. In any event, retaliation was counterproductive, a negative-sum game
that harmed consumers in the United States and in other nations.
After World War II, this country embarked on a program of reciprocal
trade agreements. Initially arranged bilaterally, they evolved into the effective multilateral trading system of the postwar years. This approach broke
down many of the historical barriers to world trade. An especially fine example occurred in the 1960s: the acceleration in world trade and economic
growth in that decade followed a sharp and mutual reduction in tariff barriers which contributed to lower prices for consumers. We continue today
to reap benefits from the policies initiated in those years.
We can turn to our own economic history for earlier examples of the
benefits of an open economy. This country began as a trading nation. If
the concept of "Gross National Product" had existed in the 18th and 19th
centuries, people would have pointed to the United States as one of the
more open economies in the world, as measured by the share of GNP involved in foreign trade. I say that even though tariff debates were common
throughout the 19th century. In its early years, the United States was
among the more trade-oriented economies in the world. We were major
suppliers of a wide variety of agricultural exports and raw materials, and of
such delicacies as rum. In addition, our service exports, such as shipping,
were an important economic activity. We were a major importer of manu-
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factured goods and a major recipient of foreign capital. These factors continued to play a critical role in the development of the American economy
during the 19th century.
Around the turn of the century the dynamics of the American economy
shifted. Exports and imports became smaller shares of GNP and remained
rather stable. U.S. investment abroad increased, gradually transforming us
from an international debtor into a world creditor. Increasingly, we became
a self-sufficient economy. Only in the last 20 years has the international
sector once again begun to increase its relative importance in our economy.
Foreign trade is now an important element in U.S. business and employment. Exports and imports of goods and services each now represent over
12 percent of our Gross National Product. Twenty years ago, exports were
less than 6 percent of GNP; imports, less than 5 percent. Much of this shift
has occurred in the past decade, when imports and exports as a share of
GNP doubled and a positive export balance has been maintained. Despite
all the concern about a U.S. merchandise trade deficit, it is clear that this
country generally runs a surplus when we consider both goods and services.
In an economy that increasingly has been shifting toward a service orientation, any analysis of international economic activity that ignores the important service sector surely is inadequate. The growing exports of services has
contributed to a net trade surplus for most of the last decade.
We should note that there is a close, but not generally appreciated, connection between imports and exports. A strong trade position requires both
a high volume of imports and a high volume of exports. In fact, the only
way, in the long run, to increase a country's exports is to increase its imports. U.S. exporters need to find foreign buyers with the dollars necessary
to buy their goods and services. In general, these dollars are obtained when
Americans import and pay for foreign goods and services.
In the short run, it is true that we can and do lend foreigners the dollars
with which to buy our exports. When such loans are made at market rates
of interest, trade is properly advanced. But when government-subsidized
credit is provided, such funds are denied to other, more productive uses in
the domestic economy.
Imports put dollars ·in the hands of foreigners-dollars which can then
be used to buy our exports. It follows that restrictions in imports will result
in fewer dollars in the hands of those in other countries that might want to
buy our wheat, aircraft, chemicals, or machinery-unless, of course, we
make up the difference through loans or transfer payments to foreigners.
In some cases, the connection between imports and exports is even more
direct. Import restraints can reduce employment and profits in our more
productive export industries, in many cases in the same region of the country. For example, in the non-rubber footwear industry, U.S. exports of
hides to foreign shoe producers suffered as a result of our restraints on the
import of foreign shoes.

The Advantages of Free Trade
Let us generalize from historical experience. The benefits of free trade
are numerous:
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1. Open trade contributes to lower prices by increasing the supply of
goods and services competing for the consumer's dollar. Thus, the
question of free trade is basically a consumer issue, and an extremely
important one.
2. Open trade minimizes the role of government in influencing privatesector decisions. This allows individuals and business firms to respond
to the needs and pressures of the international marketplace. Viewed in
this light, free trade is key to promoting economic freedom and the
private enterprise system.
3. Open trade improves the efficiency with which our own resources are
allocated. Thus, we can see that free trade yields more growth, higher
levels of employment, and an improved living standard here at home.

Aside from the direct and measurable aspects, trade stimulates competition, stirs creative activity, rewards individual initiative, and increases national productivity. Among nations, it speeds the exchange of new ideas

The question of free trade is basically a consumer
issue, and an extremely important one
and advanced technology. In the long run, international trade means the
creation of new jobs and the reduction of inflation. In sum, free trade contributes to a healthier economy-one with more job opportunities and a
wider variety of goods and services for consumers.
The Costs and Benefits of Protectionism
In this time of great interest in benefit/cost analysis, we may inquire as
to what are the costs of free trade as well as the benefits. The obvious costs
are those borne by the workers who become unemployed as a result of imports-assuming that imports are the cause. What is less apparent, however, is that any form of trade restraint to help a specific industry affected by
imports really is an internal transfer of income and wealth to that industry
from U.S. consumers. That transfer takes income and wealth away from
American workers and owners of our export industries, who bear the brunt
of retaliatory trade restrictions in the form of fewer jobs and lower profits.
Moreover, many of the benefits of protectionist measures, even to the
group advocating them, turn out to be very temporary. For example,
quotas on shoe imports resulted in an upgrading in the quality of imports.
Thus, American producers found themselves threatened in that part of the
market in which, prior to the protectionist action, they firmly dominated.
The same process is taking place in the current case of ''voluntary'' restraints of Japanese auto imports.

One of the great difficulties in public policy discussions involving protectionist measures is the fact that the beneficiaries are usually few in number.
Yet each has a large individual stake in the outcome. Moreover, those who
benefit from protectionism have little concern about the likelihood of retaliation by foreign governments on other American industries. Thus, the incentive is strong for vigorous and concentrated political activity designed to
erect special-interest trade barriers.
In addition, pleas for protectionism reflect the ability of relatively small
but influential groups to convince legislatures to adopt policies that benefit
them, albeit at the expense of citizens at large. The balance of power is extremely uneven, given the limited knowledge that consumers currently have
about these matters. Those who benefit from exports and from the greater
supply of goods and services are generally not even aware of the process by
which they benefit. Although the benefits of open trade may far exceed the
costs, those benefits-such as lower prices to consumers-are widely diffused among 50 states and 233 million residents. Any single consumer's
stake in the outcome is quite small. The individual consumer almost surely
is not aware why the price of a given item is going down-or not rising.
Consequently, resistance at the grass roots level to protectionist measures so
often is considerably less than pressures for their adoption.
Nevertheless, if an economy is to reap the benefits of free international
trade, it also must incur the costs. After all, trade changes the prices of individual commodities and, thus, forces reallocation of resources. Trade is
truly a dynamic process. Over time, a nation engaged in trade experiences
further changes in costs, technology, and tastes-all of which, in turn, alter
the composition of its exports, imports, and domestic production. The adjustments do not occur instantaneously. And we must acknowledge that the
benefits are not distributed evenly throughout the economy. Nevertheless,
the consumer savings from freer trade exceed any sensible adjustment programs instituted for those who are initially hurt by the change.
Scholarly studies typically show that the total benefits of freer trade far
exceed the costs. These gains from trade include savings to consumers,
gains from moving resources out of inefficient sectors, stimulus to investment, and increased economies of scale.
Given the economic realities of the 1980s, international competition has
become the most effective spur to greater domestic productivity. That painful but effective enhancement of the competitiveness of American enterprise is now the most important benefit from free trade.
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Self-Inflicted Wounds to American Exports
The American public knows that many countries make it difficult for
United States companies to export the goods and services that they produce. However, what is rarely appreciated is the fact that the United States
government also places numerous obstacles in the way of our exports.
Many domestic U.S. policy actions reduce the ability of American firms to
compete both at home and abroad. Two prominent categories are U.S. regulations which impose burdens on domestic production not borne by foreign producers, and export controls, which restrict various types of exports
on national security or foreign policy grounds or for domestic political
reasons.
These obstacles to our own exports are self-inflicted wounds. Frankly,
they tend to make us a laughing stock overseas when we urge other countries to lower their barriers to our exports while we make it more difficult
for our exporters.
Domestic Regulatory Barriers to Exports

The United States conducts a great variety of domestic regulatory activities which inevitably increase the prices of U.S. goods and services. In some
cases, foreign producers are not subject to similar burdens. In many other
instances, the social objectives of other nations are achieved at lower cost.
There are important, special burdens that the federal government has imposed on companies involved in foreign trade. For example, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 requires strict record-keeping standards to
monitor the anti-bribery sections of the statute. Violators of the Act face
severe penalties. A company may be fined up to $1 million, while its officers who directly participate in violations or have reason to know of them
face up to five years in prison and $10,000 in fines. Unfortunately, it is difficult to raise any discussion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act without
being criticized for being callous on ethical matters. However, this statute
has been cited for establishing a regulatory regime that displays the same
cavalier attitude toward the burdens it imposes as do many other well-intentioned regulations. A former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the agency administering the Act, has stated, "the anxieties
created by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-among men and women of
utmost good faith-have been, in my experience, without equal."
One of the major criticisms of the Act is that it has cost the American
firms export opportunities without reducing the level of foreign corruption.
By precluding American firms from taking part in questionable transactions, which may be perfectly legal and acceptable practices in many other
nations, the Act reduces the ability of U.S. firms to compete overseas. The
General Accounting Office has found in a survey of 250 American companies that 30 percent of the respondents that engaged in foreign business had
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lost business as a result of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The GAO
has recommended that Congress amend the law to clarify several important
provisions.
In addition to these highly publicized activities, several environmental
programs impose requirements with regard to exports. For example, the
regulations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
require exporters to notify countries for which products are destined that a
hazardous product is being exported 30 days in advance of the exporteven if the product is not viewed as hazardous under the laws of the importing country. The importing nation must notify the exporter that the
notice was received. No other country has such a restriction.

proceeded to invest huge amounts in that country to develop alternatives
to U.S. production, thus effectively and permanently reducing our share
of the world soybean market.
Conclusion

Most export restrictions have been ineffective in meeting the foreign
policy objectives that motivated them. Why do we keep them? Because
they seem to be an inexpensive way of showing the public that the
government is "doing something." Keeping down U.S. exports may not
show up in the budget of the State Department, but such action surely
weakens the American economy.

Export Controls

In many ways-and often without considering the effects-we have
enacted laws and promulgated regulations that prohibit U.S. exports or
make it more difficult for American companies to compete in foreign
markets. For example, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act
prohibits the export of oil from North Slope fields. A provision added to
an appropriations act for the Interior Department bans timber exports
from federal lands west of the 100th meridian. When laws get that
specific, you can detect the smell of special interest pressures.
In addition, the Export Administration Act provides for controls on
exports of goods and technology to protect national security. That
sounds fine. But, in practice, the law mandates controls over a great
variety of products, including domestically produced crude oil, refined

We have enacted laws and promulgated regulations that
make it more difficult for American companies to
compete in foreign markets
petroleum products, unprocessed red cedar and, my favorite, horses exported by sea. In 1980 the Act was employed to embargo grain exports
to the Soviet Union for national security reasons. It was invoked again in
1982 to carry out the ban against U.S. firms participating in the construction of the natural gas pipeline between the U.S.S.R. and Western
Europe.
Export controls do more than limit U.S. international trade for the
time they are imposed. These restrictions call into question the reliability
of the United States as a supplier of products to other countries, which
are likely to develop alternative sources. A clear example is soybeanshardly a product that could be considered a strategic item. Although the
purpose was to contain a short-term increase in domestic prices, the main
effect of the U.S. embargo of soybean exports in 1974 was to induce
Japan to turn to other producing countries, particularly Brazil. Japan
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Is the United Nations A Global Nanny?
International organizations such as the United Nations are expanding
their efforts to regulate business. As an important example, take the
U.N.'s draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection.
How could anyone possibly oppose guidelines designed to protect the
consumer? It takes a hard heart to question the pr'oposed United Nations' promulgation of such good things as product safety and purity,
consumer education, and international cooperation. Yet, when you push
aside the verbiage, you quickly find that the Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection would flunk a truth-in-labeling test. Indeed, the socalled Guidelines have the makings of a blueprint for a more centrally
directed society than now exists in any of the market-oriented economies
in the world.
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection contain seven objectives. Here is one sweeping goal:

To curb business practices at the national and international
levels which adversely affect consumers (including abuses of a
dominant position of market power by private and public
enterprises).
Surely we all deplore business abuses, but how do we define business practices that "adversely affect consumers"? And who defines them? Nearly
any product or business practice may be arbitrarily labeled "abusive" when
it is held up against a standard that cannot be achieved or which consumers
do not wish to pay for.
Other objectives in the Guidelines are equally troubling when we consider
their far-reaching nature. Here is an example:

To promote just, equitable and sustainable economic and social
development.
This is an imposing, high-minded ideal. But who is going to define what is
"just" and "equitable" in any specific instance? Also, who is going to decide-and then control-what is "sustainable" development? And here is
another "objective":

To establish standards of ethical conduct for those engaged in
production and distribution of goods and services to consumers.
Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory. But who will set the standards of
"ethical conduct"? Who will place themselves above all others and regulate
private behavior? How substantially would the interpretation of ethical
conduct by a totalitarian differ from that of a free society?
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The draft Guidelines also contain a set of general principles that governments are called upon to follow "to develop or strengthen their consumer
protection policies. '' These principles are written as high-minded notions of
"rights." The list is impressive and includes "physical safety from dangerous goods and services, " "economic safety from offences or malpractices
[that deny benefits to consumers]," consumer information and education,
and the right to form consumer groups and have their views represented in
"the decision-making process. "
At first blush, most of these principles or "rights" sound admirable. But
even if a consensus could be reached on them, they do not materialize out
of thin air. In each case, they imply a substantial expansion of the role of
government.
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines stipulate that there are costs attached to the array of benefits. For example, the achievement of greater
physical safety involves added costs in producing or distributing a product.
The United States has learned the lesson that government-mandated
safety standards raise the price of products-and, as a result, "price out"
some of the most vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low incomes) from
the market for those products. Ironically, such "pricing out" leads to
greater consumer risk. For example, requiring a safer but more expensive
ladder than those now in common use would probably cause many people
climb on chairs and tables instead-a much riskier approach than using existing ladders.
As for the "right to consumer education," the U.N. Guidelines show the
same high-handed attitude toward educational systems as they do toward
economic systems. Consumers in less developed countries may, in fact,
need a great deal of education with regard to products and services-but
they may need basic educational skills, such as literacy, much more. As an
educator, I am naturally suspicious whenever outside interests attempt to
dictate the contents of a curriculum. The results are usually ineffective utilization of scarce educational resources.
One general principle in the Guidelines raises very grave concerns:

the right to economic safety from offenses or malpractices
which deny consumers optimum benefit within their economic
resources.
Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish. But given the frequency with
which people in Communist countries are thrown in jail for "economic offenses" against the state, this provision is potentially very dangerous. Is
"Big Brother" to determine what are "offenses and malpractices" and the
point at which consumers have derived "optimum benefit" from resources?
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is indicated in the "right" of consumer organizations "to be consulted and to have their views represented in
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the decision-making process. "The Guidelines make absolutely no provision
for representing the views of the very businesses that are regulated. In fact,
this U.N. document is not written from the viewpoint of free-market societies: it speaks of "the decision-making process," as though only one can
exist. That is the give-away. These Guidelines are designed for a centralized, planned economy in which the national government makes the key
economic decisions.
Here is another provisions worthy of our attention:
Government policies should seek to ensure that consumers obtain the maximum benefit from their economic resources.
Does not this describe the United Nations as a global "nanny"? If I want
to buy something silly for my wife's birthday, I could wind up violating a
U.N. policy.
Here's another:

Producers should ensure the availability of reliable after-sales
service.
This Guideline probably violates the antitrust laws. Why presume that
service must be provided by the producer, unless a sale is a noncompetitive, tie-in sale? Production and service are not necessarily provided best by the same source-at least this is true in competitive, open

If I want to buy something silly for my wife's birthday,
I could wind up violating a U.N. policy
markets. Moreover, is this properly a concern of the United Nations? In
the United States, we do not consider this an area for government regulation at all.
Another Guideline in the category of ''protection of economic interests" casts the shadow of "Big Brother." One is the following:

Governments should intensify their efforts to prevent
economic offenses through systematically monitoring the
adherence to the established laws and standards by producers,
distributors and others involved in the provision of goods and
services.

Finally, we see once again how the marketplace gets superseded in a
section concerning food:

Business practices affecting the processing and distribution of
food products and especially the marketing of highly refined
and expensive food products should be regulated in order to
ensure that such practices do not conflict with consumers' interests or government aims in the area of food policy.
Who is going to judge the so-called "conflict" between consumers' interests and business practices regarding the processing, distribution and
marketing of food products? In free societies with market economies, if
there is a "conflict," consumers protect their interests by not buying the
product. Resorting to regulation simply projects "government aims" in
food policy-and that is probably the true purpose of this provision.
Moreover, why are "highly refined and expensive food products" singled
out here? What all-wise power in a nation is going to determine that a
specific category of food products presents a "conflict" with the interests
of consumers, whereas another category does not?
International regulation of the production and distribution of goods
and services via these Guidelines is a far cry from the central role of the
United Nations, which is, according to the U.N. charter, "to maintain
international peace and security." It is sad to see the U.N. diverting its
attention to large-scale forms of economic regulation when it is doing
such an inadequate job of carrying out the basic task for which it was
established. Moreover, its charter explicitly prohibits the United Nations
from intervening ''in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state." Much of the Consumer Protection Guidelines
involves just such intervention.
In short, the proposed U.N. Guidelines on Consumer Protection would
impose centralized control on the economies of sovereign nations. The
United Nations should focus instead on its fundamental role of peacekeeper and not assume the role of global nanny.

It goes on to state that consumer groups "should be encouraged and
supported in monitoring economic offenses. " What sort of government
systematically monitors the actions of private citizens? What sort of
government encourages and supports specific private groups in the
monitoring of other private groups, as though they were licensed
vigilantes? It is obvious that the authors of the Guidelines have little interest in either economic freedom or personal liberty.
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Ill. Regulation of Business

The Future of Regulatory Reform
Actions on the regulatory reform front since January 1981 have
simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes of regulatory reform enthusiasts and the fears of the defenders of the existing body of federal
regulation. Those of us who are enthusiasts for regulatory reform must
look back with disappointment at the modest changes, especially those
regarding statutes, that have been made since January, 1981. It is
fashionable, of course, to bemoan the lack of leadership on this score in
either the Executive or Legislative Branches. Although I am not inclined
to let either end of Pennsylvania Avenue off the hook, the basic problem
is much deeper. It is the fact that the necessary foundation has not been
laid in terms of public understanding and support for reducing the
burdens of regulation.
To be sure, the media are generally unhelpful, or at least extremely
naive on that score. Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act,
and you lay yourself open to charges that you want to "gut" environmental protection, that you are a green-eyeshade type who does not care
about ecology. Perhaps some modern-day Shakespeare can write the
script whereby a reform-minded economist convincingly declares, "If I
am polluted, do I not cough?"
The sad fact is that public opinion polls show uncritical-and growing-support for the position of "environment tiber alles." For example,
an April 1983 poll reported that 58 percent agreed with the following
statement: "Protecting the environment is so important that requirements
and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost."
It is also useful to observe the results of a survey examining who people trust to recommend regulatory changes. In the case of the Clean Air
Act, "environmental groups" received a positive 74 percent and university professors 72 percent. "Business and industry" was last, with 39 percent, just below the "news media" with 47 percent. Perhaps those of us
in academia have been a bit too shy and have left the field of battle to
the ''true believers.''
Today's regulatory system is far from the idyllic state in which it will
consist solely of rulings that generate more benefits than costs-but
neither is it about to wither away. The similarities between the regulatory
system of mid-1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater than the differences. Yet, when we listen to the spokesmen of the counterattack
against regulatory reform, we hear a different viewpoint. Let the opponents of regulatory reform speak for themselves so we can judge the proportions of analysis and emotion. Here is an excerpt of a recent article
by Michael Pertschuk, former chairman and now member of the Federal
Trade Commission:
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A goodly number of Mr. Reagan's regulators have now spent
two years dismantling the very regulations that in prior incarnations as corporate lawyers and lobbyists they had opposed ... Their deregulatory plans are fueled by an admixture
of free-market ideology and corporate sycophancy. Consumers are merely bugs on the windshield.
Because Mr. Pertschuk and so many of his allies are attorneys, I am
reminded of the old legal maxim: "if the law is against you, argue the

The similarities between the regulatory system of
mid-1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater
than the differences
facts; if the facts are against you, argue the law; if they are both against
you, bang on the table."
This surely is not the time to rest on laurels. Only a fraction of the
regulatory reforms envisioned in the beginning of 1981 have been accomplished. Most of the progress has been made in the form of administrative changes, especially those establishing a comprehensive system
for reviewing pending rulemaking.
William Ruckelshaus, the new administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, has sounded a cautionary note. He contends that the
current climate in Congress is not appropriate for considering changes in
environmental legislation. Ruckelshaus' statement, as well as recent
events at EPA, underscore the vital role of selecting appointees to
regulatory agencies. The experiences of recent years in several administrations demonstrate the need to select people who take a balanced approach to the benefits and burdens of regulation. Appointing uncritical
enthusiasts for expansion of government regulation inevitably produces a
regulatory regime characterized by excessive burdens and cavalier
disregard for economic impacts. Similarly, regulators who lack a basic
sympathy toward the programs they administer are counterproductive.
They can set back the prospects for regulatory reform very substantially.
Regulatory activities deemed worthy of continuation should be
managed by people who are both sympathetic to the important social objectives to be achieved and equally concerned with minimizing the
burdens. The leadership of regulatory agencies must understand that
good policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety of important
considerations-such as clean air and high employment, healthier working conditions and greater productivity.
Under the circumstances, it is sad to read of the boasting of a group
of ex-regulators in the Carter Administration that they will use networks
of civil servants at their former agencies to oppose the Reagan Administration's regulatory relief efforts. "These people will tip off the
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former administrators," says the self-styled Regulatory Audit Group.
"Yes, ... The network exists," states group member Joan Claybrook.
Managing a regulatory agency under such circumstances approaching
guerilla warfare is quite a challenge. Public understanding is helpful, and
a stronger statutory foundation for more balanced regulation becomes
essential.
Perhaps the most urgent need is to convince members of Congress to
demonstrate a sense of balance when they write the basic regulatory laws.
The task of updating regulatory statutes is not easy. The types of
changes that should be made depend on the nature of existing regulation,
the specific regulatory mechanisms currently in use, and the shortcomings, if any, in the unregulated private economy. A simple or
uniform response is not appropriate. Each regulatory law should be examined individually and carefully, and-despite the counterattacks by the
advocates of further government intervention-dispassionately.
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Expropriation Rears Its Ugly Head
The stability and fairness of our political institutions are a unique
hallmark of the United States. In fact, one of the basic arguments we
often employ to attract investment from overseas is the knowledge that
the threat of expropriation does not face private enterprises in the United
States the way it does in many nations overseas.
Unfortunately, such is not always the case. For example, local government in Oregon is attempting what is literally a power grab. Using an
obscure law (the Federal Water Power Act of 1930), public utility
districts in that state are trying to take over a private dam used for the
production of electricity via hydropower. The Merwin Dam was built by
the Pacific Power and Light Company more than half a century ago.
That investor-owned utility has been operating and maintaining it ever
since.
Government-owned utilities in many parts of the Pacific Northwest
have gained a dominant position. Now they are trying to use the procedures of federal energy regulation to require the sale of the Merwin
Dam to them at bargain basement or, more accurately, forced sale
prices.
Back in the early 1930s, the Pacific Power and Light Company spent
$20 million to build the dam. Given the tremendous amount of inflation
since then, the current value is in the neighborhood of ten times that
amount. But earlier this year, an administrative law judge of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ruled against the company. He is urging
the Commission to force Pacific Power and Light to sell the dam and its
135,000-kilowatt capacity generators to public power agencies for $10
million-which is the depreciated book value.
Using the book (historical basis) depreciated value instead of the current market value is a facade for confiscation. That arbitrary action has
all the earmarks of the foreign takeovers of American business that we
so properly decry. The company is appealing the ruling to the full
membership of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Because Merwin Dam provides only 4 percent of Pacific Power and
Light's power supplies, this episode might be described as the proverbial
tempest in a teapot. But there are many other privately built and
operated hydropower facilities in the Pacific Northwest that could come
under a similar attack should the current government position prevail.
We forget that many small private utilities in recent years have been
taken over by government-owned utilities because of the array of federal
statutes which discriminate against private enterprise.
For example, when the Environmental Protection Agency established
sewage standards several years ago, that forced privately owned sewer
companies to sell out to government agencies. That action occurred
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because, under the federal statute, EPA could give the governmentowned agency a generous grant to cover the cost of meeting its standards, but it could not give tax-paying business enterprises a nickle.
We delude ourselves if we believe that government-owned utilities are a
bargain. The prices they charge may be lower, but much of their costs
are passed on to the taxpayer and consumer in other forms. Because they
are exempt from taxes, the rest of us have to pay more-or see those
budget deficits rise even further. Because the interest on their bonds is

Public takeovers of private enterprise beget
more government intervention
tax-exempt-and hence their securities have especially attractive after-tax
yields-private companies have to pay higher interest rates in order to
sell their bonds.
Public takeovers of private enterprise beget more government intervention. The less efficient the government undertakings, the higher the
government has to raise taxes in order to subsidize them. The heavier the
tax burden on private businesses, the fewer funds they have available to
finance expansion. The result is increased pressure for bigger
government.
The moral of the tale is clear. We must constantly guard against those
well-meaning proposals that fail to take account of the full costs they impose on the private enterprise system and, thus, on the American
consumer.
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Five Ways to Improve U.S. Energy Policy
Over the years, an inconsistent blend of regulatory and tax policies has
made it more difficult and costly to achieve the nation's energy objectives. There are fundamental problems of consistency in relating the
long-term goal of increasing domestic energy supplies and the workings
of regulatory and tax policies.
For example, for many years depletion allowances encouraged
domestic production while "prorationing" restricted the actual amounts
that could be produced. Price controls on natural gas encouraged consumption of energy, while import restrictions curtailed the supply of
energy. Yet, earlier periods of American history showed that-without
either government subsidy or controls-the private sector could and did
readily adjust to changes in the availabilty of and demand for energy.
When we examine the pre-regulatory period, we find that successive
shifts occurred from one energy source to another, as the underlying
economics-relative prices-changed. The changes were comparatively
quick and easy. In 1800, for example, illumination was provided mainly
by candles and oil lamps, with fuel for the lamps coming from whale oil.
Yet, whales did not become extinct as the country grew. As the price of
whale oil rose, consumers simply switched to substitutes. In the 1850s,
coal oil or kerosene dominated the residential market for illumination.
Its success was followed by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a new
fuel that had appeared in the market, petroleum.
The shifts from whale oil to kerosene to gasoline resulted not from an
act of Congress or a subsidy from the Treasury, but from successive
movements in the price of energy. The implication is clear: the sooner
that government frees all energy sources, such as natural gas, from artificial price restraints, the sooner will new domestic energy sources
become commercially competitive. Conversely, the continuation of price
controls on natural gas delays the time when new domestic sources, including solar energy or synthetic fuels, will come into widespread use.
The major spur to developing domestic energy sources is not government
subsidy, but price decontrol of existing energy sources.
The clash between economic efficiency and government regulation is
currently most visible in the area of natural gas. The Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 was designed to raise the wellhead prices of natural gas in
order to help achieve a balance between supply and demand. But the
numerous price disparities among different categories of gas prompted
new inefficiencies. The smooth transition to a deregulated market envisioned by the framers of the Act will not occur under the existing statute.
High-priced natural gas is being imported from Canada at a time when
cheaper U.S. supplies are in surplus. The problems in the gas market
have been caused by the interaction of inflexible federal price control and
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rigid contracts between pipeline companies and producers. The contracts,
in turn, were by-products of the long and convoluted history of government regulation of energy.
The basic problem is that federal regulation is too rigid to allow gas
prices to reflect changing conditions. Natural gas prices are now at levels
that have encouraged switching back to oil. With an estimated 15 percent
of capacity idle, it is not clear that a sharp run up in prices would result
if natural gas were deregulated. The successful decontrol of oil prices in
1981 provides the appropriate model.
The Future Role of Regulatory Policy
There is another way in which regulation hinders domestic energy production. Environmental and other regulations create major obstacles facing virtually every proposed energy project-including those that are
finally approved. One of the most serious energy problems in the United
States today is the long delays that occur during the planning and construction phases of new energy projects-even those that successfully surmount all of the regulatory obstacles. From the investor's viewpoint,
those problems increase uncertainty-which can be devastating for major
capital projects such as those involved in developing new forms of
energy. Let us recall that it took a special act of Congress to override
legal and ecological barriers so that the Alaskan pipeline could proceed.

A realistic and effective government policy for the
energy sector of the economy requires changes in the
federal tax and regulatory systems
Nevertheless, public concern about pollution of air and water and
destruction of natural resources continues to be great. The need, thus, is
for a careful review of the vast and cumbersome regulatory labyrinth.
The purpose should be to achieve a more cost-effective regulatory regime
by eliminating or revising the numerous regulations that do not pass the
economic test of generating more benefits than costs.
Recommendations
From the viewpoint of better meeting the needs of American consumers, a realistic and effective government policy for the energy sector
of the economy requires changes in the federal tax and regulatory
systems. These changes fall into two categories: (1) eliminating the
special benefits that have been granted to the various segments of the
energy industry, and (2) simultaneously removing the many obstacles that
have been placed in the industry's path. Here is a brief outline of the
needed changes:
(1) Eliminate the windfall profits tax. That tax does nothing to help
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curtail energy consumption, but it simultaneously reduces the financial
ability of the private sector to increase domestic energy production.
(2) Eliminate the regulatory functions of the Department of Energy.
The sooner that domestic energy prices equal world market prices, the
sooner will new domestic energy sources-conventional and unconventional, including synthetic fuel, solar energy, geothermal etc.-become
competitive. Moreover, realistic prices are the most effective stimulus to
energy conservation. Deregulation of natural gas prices is long overdue.
(3) Eliminate the host of tax breaks for specialized energy projects.
Tax subsidies would no longer be needed in an environment where
realistic energy prices prevail. The experience of the home insulation industry is instructive. The producers in that industry found that their
order books became full when the public realized that insulation is a
good way of reducing high and rising energy costs. The federal subsidies
actually came later.
(4) Cut back the regulatory obstacles which impede the construction
and operation of new energy projects. What is truly needed is a comprehensive reform of the regulatory process. Without these reforms,
many of the tax incentives for new investment will be ineffective. The inability to obtain the many government permits needed for a new project
cannot be overcome by increasing the after-tax rate of return.
(5) Cut back the expenditure subsidies for the highly specific energy activities that the Congress arbitrarily has chosen to support. These special
aids would no longer be necessary if the first four proposals are adopted.
The elimination of the windfall profits tax revenues would make it more
urgent to reduce these low-priority outlays in order to minimize budget
deficits.
Boiled down to its essence, the most effective regulatory policy to promote domestic energy development and production is to achieve a wellfunctioning market economy that does not require special policies for
any specific industry-energy or any other. In an analogous manner, the
optimum tax policy is to treat the activities of the energy industry exactly
the same way as any other business-without prejudice or favoritism.
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IV. Economic Change in the 1980s

In Change There Is Opportunity
"Forth into the future's dawning glow" is what the poet tells us. The
economist, in contrast, traditionally is the wet blanket. Realistically, the
future is not likely to be glowing. But there will be a future in which
each industry, company, and individual will have an opportunity to succeed or to fail.
What kind of future does American business face in the coming
decade? The shortest response on record would be simply to say, "We
don't know." But this professor does not use short answer tests, even for
himself. Like many students trying to answer a difficult essay question,
let us reconnoiter around the question before we respond. To begin with,
life is full of surprises. Looking back over the past three decades, who
had any idea that we would see the United States in two major wars, or
that inflation and unemployment would ever again reach double digits,
or that hard rock would become something you listen to rather than try
to pulverize? On the latter score, sometimes I am tempted to revert.
Traditionally, we have associated growth with opportunity. A rapidly
expanding national economy, almost by definition, generates a great
array of new markets, new products, and new jobs. That surely was true
for much of the past. But, more recently, when the growth rate of the
economy dropped, the expectations of most of us declined. The outlook
of many turned sour because, supposedly, opportunity was also
declining.
But perhaps the economist does not have to be totally the wet blanket
after all. Even in a bad year, our private enterprise system generates far
more jobs and income per capita than other economic systems do in their
best years. After all, the acid test of the strength, durability, and attractiveness of a private enterprise economy occurs when the borders between
a capitalist and a communist nation are opened. We can predict with unfailing accuracy the direction in which people will voluntarily move.
Whatever their limitations, capitalistic societies win overwhelmingly when
people vote with their feet.
But there are more specific reasons for sounding an upbeat note. We
have learned that change also brings opportunity. And the continued advances in technology surely indicate that the pace of change will not
slacken. There is a renewal in our society of faith in science and technology. The 1980s will see the introduction of more changes resulting
from new technology than the 1970s-changes in basic office and factory
work procedures and further shifts from standard products to more
sophisticated items such as word processors and robots, which are
hybrids of goods and services.
To succeed in times of change, rather than in periods of rapid growth,
is more of a challenge. Not every industry, and surely not every company
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or individual, necessarily comes out a winner. But it is a far more
dynamic situation than the broad set of numbers show at first blush.
After all, in every year-good, bad, or indifferent-someone is starting a
company or launching a product or hatching an idea that will grow and

To succeed in times of change, rather than in periods
of rapid growth, is more of a challenge
prosper. At the time, we are not able to forecast the specific winners or
losers. But with the benefit of hindsight, we know that there will be some
of each. Similarly, we are not a static society. The boom towns of the
1960s and 1970s were in different locations than the likely growth areas
of the 1980s. But the same may undoubtedly be true for the places that
declined in the '60s and '70s, as well as those that will fizzle in the '80s.
Let us focus on four types of changes that will vitally affect business
opportunities in the decade of the 1980s and beyond. We need to
acknowledge that many of those who respond to the changes may indeed
see them as opportunities. Yet, others, especially those who merely react
passively, will find them more in the nature of threats.
Economic and Social Changes

First of all, we are already seeing a shift in emphasis from traditional
smokestack industries to service and manufacturing companies whose
products have a much higher content of knowledge, information, and
technical skill. But it is important to keep that change in perspective.
Clearly, there is genuine reason for concern about the future in regions
of high unemployment and declining sales. But U.S. manufacturing companies are not about to collapse. Indeed, those firms that succeed in
enhancing their productivity and controlling their costs will prosper.
Let us turn to the second important shift, which is geographic. Increasingly, people are finding that the quality of life often diminishes in the
largest metropolitan areas, and that small towns still lack the amenities
and diversity of activity that many people have come to expect. Mediumsize cities now have the most favorable growth prospects for the years
ahead. That is where many people want to live, and where companies are
setting up new factories, branch stores, and regional offices. The industrial growth is occurring in cities large enough to provide a good
range of amenities to their citizens, but small enough so that the individual does not feel overwhelmed.
This geographic shift is also taking place in good measure because of a
related but undramatic, long-term trend occurring in the American
economy. It is the adjustment to a lower level of inflation. This is a
positive-but not a painless-process. Costs are often lower in the
medium-sized cities. There is also a new sense of realism in business deci-
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sion making today. Companies are becoming more cost-conscious.
Poorly justified company investments and lax expense commitments are
no longer automatically bailed out by inflation. Managements are learning once again the advantages of being competitive in an economy in
which the federal government does not automatically come to help out
every loser in the marketplace.
Similarly, employees are learning that their wages, salaries and fringe
benefits are vitally dependent on the future success of their company.
Workers are increasingly-though perhaps not enthusiastically-willing
to accept changes in contracts, workrules, and job practices necessary to
ensure their company's future. Consumers are learning the hard way that
purchases of art and coins and postage stamps are once again judged as
consumption activities, rather than easy investments in what had been a
continually rising price level.
But this new sense of realism is very recent. It could easily be reversed
if the federal government decides to bail out various declining industries.
A third important shift in the years ahead is the renewed emphasis on
the private sector of the economy. People are once again advocating a
reduced role for government as an agent of social change. Not that the
state will wither away. But, certainly for the next several years, we can
expect that the private sector will be growing faster than the public sector. In part, that is a reaction to the rapid expansion in government activities that we have witnessed in recent decades-an expansion that often
has created more problems than it has cured. That shift reflects the
rediscovery that the private enterprise system, despite its various shortcomings, is still the primary engine of progress in our society and the key
generator of income and wealth.
The fourth and final shift is a growth in our communal perspective,
from essentially domestic-national concerns to worldwide-multinational
dimensions. Surely, we cannot anticipate any movement to world government. That would run counter to the prevailing trend of decentralization

We are increasingly abandoning the notion that if anything
goes wrong in an individual's life experience, the blame
should be borne by society as a whole
of governmental power in modern societies. What comes to mind are
such obvious but undramatic changes as the doubling in the proportion
of our national production that is exported-as well as a doubling in the
proportion of our national income that is spent on imports.
Then, of course, we have experienced quite a few dramatic instances of
the powerful impact of foreign developments on our domestic society.
Two related cases are the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74 and the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, both of which had immediate and costly impacts on
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our economy as well as on our personal lifestyles.
In addition, many industries are feeling the effects of foreign competition. The traditional response too often is to complain to the government
and ask it to restrict imports. The more satisfactory approach, of course
is to examine ourselves and see how we can do better. After all, we can-'
not blame our poor production practices-on for({gners. A very considerable pace of change can be expected in the years ahead, as well as
no shortage of problems in our society. The changes surely will provide
growing opportunities for those who try to take advantage of them.

Opportunity, Risk-and Work
Along with the opportunity that change brings, however, there is also
greater uncertainty. With greater opportunity there goes, of course, more
risk. And that, too, is another area of change that is becoming visible.
As a nation, we are increasingly abandoning the notion that, if anything
goes wrong in an individual's life experience, the blame should be borne
by "them," by society as a whole. We are coming to realize that if it is
our skills and efforts that should be rewarded when things go well-then
that also implies the reverse. It is our individual responsibility when
things do not work out as well as we expected them to. Thus, greater opportunity also implies more individual responsibility.
Finally, it has been my observation over many years that one factor is
often the determining variable. It is the original four-letter wordWORK. The degree of sustained industriousness, the ability to work hard
even in the face of unexpected disappointments, is often the most important long-run factor influencing who will succeed greatly or who will just
make it-or who will fail.
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The Economic Challenges of the 1980s
The odds favor a future period of sustained economic growth, accompanied by moderate inflation. But this happy turn of events is not written in the stars. Surely, the political process is not going to keep
economic policy on automatic pilot for any length of time. Moreover, inflation may well accelerate again and the nation's growth rate may sputter. Yet a healthier economy will be more likely if, as a nation, we make
three types of difficult decisions:
1. Labor and management in each industry must deal with the competitive problems that face them, rather than seek government assistance.
Although discussions of economic policy inevitably are drawn to publicsector actions, we need to be reminded that ours is a private enterprise
system in which most economic decisions are made in the private sector.
After all, so many of the difficuliies facing our key smokestack industries are due to decisions by the companies and the unions in those industries. Management and unions together have pushed their labor costs
far beyond other American manufacturing industries, and, until recently,
the industries have emphasized high unit profit but stagnant rather than
growing market areas. Many industries have also been slow in adopting
new technology.
Moreover, it is intriguing to examine the few cases where management
is about to close a low-or no-profit factory-and the employees purchase
it. Then the new owners proceed to make the difficult decisions-to slim
down manager and worker ranks, eliminate unproductive work practices,
and so forth. Ironically, if labor and management had agreed to that
course of action earlier, in many cases the factory would not have been
closed down in the first place.
The easy answer to today's difficulties-which often unites management and labor-is to go to Washington for credit or import restraints or
other subsidies. This special treatment, of course, comes at the expense
of consumers and taxpayers. It should be opposed primarily because it
provides the wrong signals for future economic behavior.
2. Government decision makers must face up to the fact that the 1981
tax cuts have not been matched by expenditure reductions. In a real
sense, those tax cuts have not yet been earned. They can be earned,
however, by reducing the rapid growth of federal outlays. Three major
areas of the budget are promising candidates for further pruning. We all
know about entitlements and defense. But it does not require exhaustive
research to reveal a third part of the budget: "all other." Not all the
items in that part of the budget are social programs, nor have they been
cut to the bone. Generously funded programs such as subsidies to dairy,
tobacco, and sugar producers and to ship builders and ship operators are
good-or bad-examples. These and many other special benefits to
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specific segments of society are in the budget simply because of the
political muscle of the special-interest groups supporting them.
Given the outlook for substantial deficit spending, more of those
sacred cows in the federal budget should be taken out of the feedlot and
led to slaughter. Our economic prospects would be a lot brighter if the
deficits were half their current size. The sensible solution is not to raise
taxes. Rather, it is to cut spending comprehensively in each of the three
categories.
3. Finally, to face the real economic problems in our country today,
we must focus more on our own shortcomings rather than take the easy,
and low, road of blaming our economic difficulties on "foreign devils."
We should begin by acknowledging the obstacles that we have put in the
way of our own exports. Our "holier than thou" attitude toward protectionism offends our trading partners who are well aware of our many
obstacles to their exports-as well as our wounds that have been selfinflicted through federal restrictions on our own exports (often for
foreign policy purposes). At a time when reciprocity has become a new
buzzword in foreign trade policy, perhaps we can reduce some of the
barriers to our own exports and then ''reciprocate'' by reducing some of
our import barriers.

act so as to avoid the need to press the panic button.
Let me conclude with this note. Please remember during the difficult
periods ahead that, of all the bumper stickers and marching slogans one
might use, the most appropriate sign is the one that proclaims, "The end
of the world has been postponed."

Conclusion
My final point is to stress the importance of time as a key variable in
economic decision making. For example, the panaceas tend to be popular
because the benefits come early and the costs later. An easy money
policy is a good example. Conversely, the tough but effective approaches, such as monetary restraint to curb escalating inflation,
generate their costs before their benefits.

An important characteristic of good management
is to make tough decisions promptly
Yet, those hard choices become even more difficult the longer we wait.
The longer that the tough decisions are postponed, the more imbedded
"entitlements" arise in the workplace, and the greater nm;nber of trade
obstacles are in place, and so on. And time can be crucial in a budget
restraint effort. After all, the most uneconomical project may begin to
develop a serious economic justification after substantial outlays are
made on it. The argument for completing it becomes compelling: What is
the value of half a bridge, or half a breeder reactor, or half a nuclear
carrier?
Thus, an important characteristic of good management, whether in the
private or the public sector, is to make tough decisions promptly. Most
people can make those decisions in a time of crisis. The challenge is to
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